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Contracting is an ever-important function that enables the federal government to acquire 
everything from small commodities to the most complex weapons systems. With recent 
fiscal constraints, the potential for fraud is a growing concern, and the ability to detect 
fraud, waste, and abuse is considered to be an essential skill. Additionally, in order to 
ensure auditability, an organization must emphasize the presence of competent personnel, 
capable processes, and effective internal controls. 
The purpose of this research is to assess the knowledge-level of Air Force 
contracting professionals as it pertains to the ability to identify procurement fraud within 
the six phases of contracting and the five internal control components. The research 
deployed a procurement fraud survey with procurement fraud knowledge questions and 
organizational perception questions within the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center. The 
results of the survey identified a varying level of knowledge about procurement fraud 
among survey participants. The research also presented recommendations and areas for 
further research based on the results of the survey. 
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This research report addresses the subject of contracting personnel’s procurement 
fraud knowledge within an Air Force organization. It spans six chapters that discuss the 
literature reviewed throughout the research process, the organization to which the survey 
tool was deployed, the methodology used, findings, analysis and recommendations 
identified, and finally, a summary, conclusion, and  areas for further research provided.  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to this research study. It 
begins by providing a background on procurement fraud throughout the Department of 
Defense (DOD) and continues with the purpose of this research. Next, the chapter will 
introduce the research questions proposed in this report along with the benefits and 
limitations of this study. This will be followed by a short description of the methodology 
used in the research study. Finally, the chapter will describe the organization of this 
report.  
A. BACKGROUND 
The role of the contracting professional within the DOD has significantly 
increased throughout the last decade in all facets of acquisition due to increased spending 
both domestically and in the contingency environment (Government Accounting Office 
[GAO], 2013). Within the last decade, the DOD has spent an increasing dollar amount on 
procurements in order to support Operations Noble Eagle and Iraqi Freedom in multiple 
continents. Although these operations are beginning to decrease, the need for well-trained 
contract professionals is more important than ever due to the fact that there are more 
contractors than military personnel remaining in Iraq and Afghanistan (GAO, 2012). 
Over the last two years, the threats of sequestration and the defense budget cuts have 
made it difficult to provide a large, well-trained force due to civilian hiring freezes and 
significant cuts to military contracting professionals. Tied into the worries of 
sequestration were the 2013 furloughs that resulted from a government shutdown. 
According to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, these furloughs 
directly impacted the contracting workforce, not only by giving them a larger workload 
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after the shutdown, but also by making government employment a less viable prospect 
for long-term employment (2013). As the GAO notes (2013),  
Over the next 5 years, DOD expects to invest more than $300 billion 
(fiscal year 2013 dollars) on the development and procurement of major 
defense acquisition programs. With the prospect of slowly growing or flat 
defense budgets for years to come, DOD must get better returns on its 
weapon system investments and find ways to deliver capability to the 
warfighter for less than it has in the past. (p. 149) 
While there are many opportunities for fraud within the contracting process, there 
is also the potential for fraud when an organization does not have effective internal 
controls and capable processes in place. Rendon and Rendon (in press) state that once a 
procurement process is in place, it is essential to establish effective internal controls in 
order to reduce the potential for fraud within an organization. It is because of these 
potentials for fraud that this research is necessary. 
B. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is to assess Air Force contracting officials’ level of 
procurement fraud knowledge as it relates to the contract management process, the five 
components of the internal control framework, and procurement fraud schemes. In 
addition, this research will provide insight into the contracting professional’s perceptions 
of the vulnerabilities for fraud within their organization. Finally, this research will focus 
on the training provided to Air Force contracting professionals in the area of procurement 
fraud. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research questions for this research project include the following:  
1. What is the contracting workforce’s knowledge level of procurement fraud 
as related to the contract management process, the internal control 
components, and the procurement fraud scheme categories? 
2. What is the contracting workforce’s perception of procurement fraud 
vulnerability as related to the contract management process, the internal 
control components, and the procurement fraud scheme categories? 
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3. What is the procurement fraud coverage within the Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU) required/recommended courses for contracting 
professionals? 
D. BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS 
This research study will provide insight into the contracting professional’s 
perspective on government contracting fraud. The results of this research study may lead 
to improvements in preventing or detecting fraud across the DOD agencies. Oftentimes, 
employees within an organization feel as though their suggestions or problems are 
quashed at lower levels of the hierarchical chain of command. Additionally, this research 
seeks to identify those instances where fraud is more likely to be committed, as well as 
those areas vulnerable to fraud. Finally, this study will identify gaps within the current 
DAU curriculum as it pertains to fraud education.  
One limitation of this study is the survey distribution method. The survey was 
deployed to potential participants with an e-mail notification. In his research, Paxson 
(1995) found that in this day of advanced technology and limited resources, participants 
may be inundated with too many e-mails and not give the survey the time and thought it 
requires. The subjects may lack interest and take the survey too quickly and with a lack 
of honest opinions, leading to skewed data. Paxson (1995) also concluded that a low 
response rate can skew data in that a small number of responders is not likely to 
adequately represent the population as a whole. Also, if done in a group or squadron 
setting, individuals may not believe that their surveys will remain anonymous. Though 
the assessment tool is deployed in a way that removes undue influence, results may be 
hindered by a perception that those in higher positions are the main drivers of the survey. 
Finally, this research is limited due to the fact the survey was deployed to only one U.S. 
Air Force (USAF) organization. Had the survey been deployed throughout all of the 
USAF, the DOD, or the entire government organization, there would likely be a larger 
sample population from which to gather results. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology is based on a review of current literature, deployment 
of a previously developed assessment tool, and analysis of the survey results. The 
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literature review contains multiple government reports that describe the constant 
evolution of the federal contracting process, most notably DOD, as well as the framework 
of the internal component controls and common fraud indicators associated with the 
contracting process. This review also utilized literature from private contracting 
organizations in the civilian sector to portray a larger picture of the potential for fraud 
and different perspectives from non-governmental organizations.  
In addition to the literature review, this research utilized a previously created 
assessment tool that posed questions to assess procurement fraud knowledge, perceptions 
of contracting personnel, and demographic information. The survey was made available 
to all Air Force Nuclear Weapon Center (AFNWC) procurement contracting offices via 
Lime Survey, a web-based software, where all contracting officers and specialists were 
given four weeks to complete and submit the assessment. Once the four-week window 
closed, survey responses were analyzed in order to determine whether there were 
significant knowledge deficiencies within the contract management process, the internal 
controls, and the procurement fraud schemes. Finally, the researchers reviewed course 
information from the Defense Acquisition University to determine whether its course 
catalog contained coverage of fraud training within their course overview. Based on 
research results, recommendations for improvement will be made in the areas of contract 
management process, internal controls, and procurement fraud schemes. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
The report consists of six chapters, including this introduction. Chapter II contains 
a literature review on the contract management process, the internal control framework, 
and the different types of procurement fraud schemes. Chapter III describes the 
organization surveyed. Chapter IV reviews the methodology used in the deployment of 
the survey. Chapter V provides the detailed findings and analysis of the results of the 
survey. Chapter VI consists of a summary, conclusion, and areas for further research. 
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced the importance of the contracting career field in a fiscally 
constrained environment by providing a background. Next, it introduced the purpose of 
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this research study, which was to assess the level of Air Force contracting officials’ 
procurement fraud knowledge. Additionally, the three research questions were presented 
along with the benefits and limitations of this study. Finally, the research methodology 
for this study was reviewed, and the organization of the report was explained. The next 
chapter will provide a literature review that covers the contract management process, the 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a literature review on the contract management process, the 
five components of the internal control framework, and the six most common 
procurement fraud schemes perpetrated in contracting, specifically within DOD 
contracting. In addition, a summary of the impact of fraud and problems within the DOD 
will be examined along with the department’s response to fraud issues and the possible 
future consequences caused by contracting deficiencies. 
B. CONTRACT MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
For those organizations not directly involved, the contracting process is 
considered a simple one. Once the government awards the contract and the contractor 
begins performance, the process is complete. To the informed buyer, however, the 
contracting process follows a set lifecycle. It begins with planning for a procurement and 
follows a logical pattern that does not conclude until the contract has been completed and 
finally closed out. Figure 1 outlines the six phases of the contract management process. 
The distinct objectives and importance of each of these phases will be described in 
further detail next.  
 
Figure 1.  Contract Management Process (from Rendon, 2008, p. 164) 
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1. Procurement Planning 
As seen in Figure 1, the first phase in a well-executed procurement process is 
procurement planning. According to Garrett, procurement planning is  
the process of identifying which business needs can be best met by 
procuring products or services outside the organization. This process 
involves determining whether to procure, how to procure, what to procure, 
how much to procure, and when to procure. (Garrett, 2007, p. 81)  
As stated by Rendon and Snider (2008), procurement planning is accomplished through 
defining the requirement, conducting thorough market research, preparing the necessary 
requirements documents, creating a realistic budget, discussing contract type, and 
conducting risk analysis. In order to accomplish these steps, a careful plan, along with 
collaboration between the contracting office and the internal government requirements 
generator, hereafter referred to as customer or end user, are crucial in ensuring that the 
customer has the best possible product or service. In a time of government spending cuts, 
a properly planned and collaborated procurement can help reduce the costs associated 
with changes to the requirement (Walker, Bakker, Schotanus, & Harland, 2013). 
a. Defining the Requirement 
Similar to personal purchasing, the first step in planning is defining what is 
needed. In order to define the requirement, the customers must decide exactly what their 
needs are in order to make a purchase. The customers ask various questions in order to 
determine the right path and ensure that the right instrument is utilized to procure the 
requirement. According to Handfield, Johnson, Sturszl, and Tracey (2014), these 
questions include: Does the customer require a product or a service? Has the 
product/service been purchased before? If so, is the required product/service available 
commercially? If it is a service, what is the length of time required for services? What is 
the complexity of the requirement?  
In order to ensure that the requirement is properly defined, it is imperative that all 
stakeholders agree upon the answers to these questions and others within the procurement 
process. The stakeholders include the customer and/or technical experts within the 
originating activity and the contracting officer. In larger acquisitions, personnel within an 
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integrated product team (IPT) are considered the stakeholders and include not only the 
previously mentioned team members but also legal office personnel, finance personnel, 
and upper level management.  
b. Conducting Market Research 
After the requirement has been properly defined, the customer must perform 
thorough market research in order to collect necessary data to assist in answering the 
previously mentioned questions. For instance, conducting market research can determine 
whether or not the requirement is commercially available. Also, the customer can decide 
whether competition is available or if only one source can provide the requirement by 
looking up previous requirements. Competition is an important aspect of government 
contracting; therefore, it is crucial that the acquisition team do their due diligence in order 
to ensure maximum competition when practicable. Answering these questions provides 
the acquisition team with a foundation from which they can determine what strategy, 
contract vehicle, and exceptions may apply to the procurement. Not only is market 
research considered the intelligent thing to do, it is also mandated. The Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) part 10 directs the extent of market research necessary for 
each type of acquisition. 
c. Requirements Documents 
Depending on the complexity of the requirement, there may be many documents 
necessary within the procurement planning phase. Just as with any other phase of the 
contracting process, the FAR dictates which documents are mandated by law and which 
documents are used as needed. Rendon and Snider (2008) state that there is an order of 
precedence found within FAR Part 11 that details the main documents required within the 
procurement process. These documents include the funding document, the performance 
oriented documents, such as the Performance Work Statement (PWS), Statement of Work 
(SOW), or the Statement of Objectives, and any “Detailed, design-oriented documents” 
(FAR 11.101). In addition, the FAR specifies within part 11 that special documentation is 
needed to justify any special circumstances, the use of a brand name or equal product, or 
the use of service contracts and items peculiar to one manufacturer.  
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2. Solicitation Planning 
The completion of the procurement planning phase then feeds into the solicitation 
planning process. The acquisition team uses the market research and documents 
generated within the first phase to identify specific needs to proceed with the solicitation. 
According to Rendon and Snider (2008), these needs include determining the most 
suitable procurement method, identifying what type of contract to award, determining 
and developing the correct type of solicitation document, establishing evaluation criteria, 
determining terms and conditions, and finalizing the solicitation. All of these steps within 
the process are then utilized to select the successful offeror. 
a. Determining Procurement Method 
The process to determine which method to use to procure an item or service can 
seem difficult because it is all dependent on variables such as cost, complexity, and risk. 
The FAR assists the buyer in reducing the available options by defining which methods 
to use for both cost and complexity. For any acquisition below the micro-purchase 
threshold (currently $3,000), the preferred method for procurement is the Government 
Purchase Card, which gives the purchasing power directly to the customer in order to free 
up the contracting specialist for more complex buys. The next cost threshold is the 
Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT) (currently $150,000) with detailed procedures 
outlined within FAR 13 (Simplified Acquisition Procedures). Finally, for those 
acquisitions that are priced above the SAT, the team must further determine where the 
complexity of the acquisition is located on the best value continuum described in FAR 
15. The continuum ranges from procedures to select the more simplistic lowest price 
technically acceptable (LPTA) offer, to the more difficult and time-consuming full 
tradeoff procedures utilized for acquisitions, which present a large degree of complexity 
and probability of risk.  
In addition to cost, risk, and complexity, the government must also use a variety 
of market research tools to decide whether they will award a contract based on a sole 
source (non-competitive) or multiple source (competitive) environment. Unlike the 
commercial business sector, adherence to public policy requires that the government 
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make all possible efforts to utilize full and open competition in accordance with the 
Competition in Contracting Act (CICA), which was created in 1984. Perlman (2007) 
states that full and open competition safeguards against both intentional fraud as well as 
uninformed buyers to ensure that the government receives the best bargain possible. 
However, as stated by Reed, Luna, and Pike (2005), due to these restrictions imposed on 
public procurement, the best quality item may not necessarily be purchased at the lowest 
possible price. Rather, some contracts may be set-aside in order to help meet socio-
economic goals that are not applicable to private firms. Likewise, Rendon and Snider 
(2008) point out that unlike private firms, the government is also responsible for adhering 
to public policy, “some of which might actually work against ‘the bottom line’” (p. 19).  
b. Contract Type and Structure 
Once the type of procurement method has been determined, it is up to the 
contracting team to determine which type of contract it will employ, and what structure 
the contract will take. FAR 16 (2014) divides the types of contracts into two main 
categories that represent two very different perspectives. On one end of the spectrum, the 
fixed price contract presents the lowest risk to the government and places the majority of 
the risk on the contractor. According to FAR 16.202-2 (2014), the fixed price contract is 
especially useful “for acquiring special items or for acquiring other supplies or services 
on the basis of reasonably definite functional or detailed specifications when the 
contracting officer can establish fair and reasonable prices at the outset” (FAR, 2014). On 
the other end of the spectrum, a cost-reimbursement contract is recommended when the 
requirement has never been performed before, the actual costs are unknown, or a fixed-
price contract cannot fulfill the needs of the procurement. This type of contract places 
much more risk onto the government, and unlike the fixed-price contract, it does not 
require a final product but instead requires the contractor’s “best effort” (Garrett, 2007). 
Figure 2 shows the contract types that can be utilized as well as the risk involved with 
each type of contract.  
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Figure 2.  Types of Contracts (after Garrett, 2007, p. 127) 
c. Establishing Evaluation Criteria 
Oftentimes, establishing proposal evaluation criteria is a very important step 
within the procurement process that is undervalued. When this happens, the evaluation 
criteria that are developed by the procurement team do not produce the desired output 
from contractors who bid on the requirement (also referred to as offerors). The Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU) glossary defines evaluation criteria as “standards by which 
accomplishments of required technical and operational effectiveness and/or sustainability 
characteristics or resolution of operational issues may be assessed” (DAU, 2013). It is 
crucial to correctly identify the necessary evaluation criteria that need to be assessed in 
order to ensure that the resulting proposals will be graded in accordance with the 
specifications that the government desired. Along with utilizing the correct verbiage for 
evaluation, it is essential to ensure that the criteria are limited to only those necessary to 
produce the desired result and not restrictively descriptive in order to reduce the strain on 
the evaluation team. Finally, correct identification of the necessary criteria allows the 
team to better decide whether they will proceed with a LPTA contract award or a form of 
tradeoff process along the best value continuum. 
3. Solicitation 
After completion of the solicitation planning phase, the solicitation is finalized 
and posted for viewing by industry. The government can solicit in various ways including 
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but not limited to request for proposal (RFP), request for quote (RFQ), or invitation for 
bid (IFB). Depending on the expected amount of the solicitation, it can be posted orally, 
physically, or electronically. While many solicitations are posted, it is essential that the 
government buyer post a quality solicitation in order to ensure a successful procurement 
process. Garrett emphasizes this point when he states, “Better solicitations from the buyer 
generally result in having better bids, quotes, proposals, or tenders submitted by the seller 
in a more timely manner. Poorly communicated solicitations often result in delays, 
confusion, fewer bids or proposals, and lower-quality responses” (2007, p. 24). 
a. Pre-proposal Conference 
Pre-proposal conferences are a powerful tool that can be useful when the 
government requirement is more technically complex or hard to define. Garrett (2007) 
states that the pre-proposal conference provides a level playing field for all potential 
bidders and allows them to meet with the government procurement team to work through 
any questions that they may have. The questions posed by industry in regards to the 
solicitation many times point out possible flaws in the requirement and help to provide 
the best possible product or service. Once all interested parties have a common 
understanding of the requirements and all questions are addressed, the government 
acquisition team then formally addresses the questions through an amendment to the 
solicitation to allow those unable to attend the conference the opportunity to view the 
proceedings. 
b. Advertising Requirements 
Depending on the dollar amount of the solicitation, there are multiple possibilities 
for advertising a requirement. The most effective way to reach potential offerors in 
today’s technologically advanced age is by posting electronically via websites such as the 
Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOps) and the General Services Administration 
(GSA), both of which are Government Points of Entry (GPE) completely controlled by 




of posting to the GPE is to ensure that competition is maximized by providing a single, 
trusted source for contractors to view potential work opportunities (DAU Acquipedia 
Synopses, 2014).  
4. Source Selection 
The source selection phase serves as the determination process in which the 
government acquisition team thoroughly evaluates all submitted proposals. It culminates 
with the award of a contract to the successful offeror. In 2011, in response to service-
specific procedures, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD) released 
guidance to consolidate specific procedures and enable a joint effort in source selections 
in an attempt to streamline and better define procedures in acquisition. The Director of 
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) during that time, stated in a memo 
that “overall, the DOD Source Selection Procedures are designed to provide for uniform 
Source Selection guidance within the Department and simplify the Source Selection 
Process” (OUSD, 2011, p. 1).  
a. Source Selection Organization 
As discussed previously, a government acquisition team is responsible for 
reviewing and evaluating all proposals that are submitted for each requirement by 
interested contractors. This team is also defined within the DOD Source Selection 
Procedures and consists of the Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO), the Source Selection 
Authority (SSA), the Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB), and other agency 
personnel such as legal personnel, finance personnel, and the organization’s small 
business specialist. In addition, when the acquisition exceeds $100M, the Source 
Selection Team (SST) is also required to include a Source Selection Advisory Council 
(SSAC), which provides additional support to the SSA (OUSD, 2011). 
The SSA is ultimately responsible for appointing SSEB chairs, ensuring that the 
source selection process is conducted in the proper manner, maintaining a proper 
schedule, and selecting the offer that “offers the best value to the government in 
accordance with established evaluation criteria in Section M” (OUSD, 2011, p. 4). The 
PCO manages all aspects of the administrative and contractual portions of the acquisition. 
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The PCO is responsible for assisting the SSA in his or her duties and in many instances 
can also double as the SSA. The SSEB is composed of a team chair and multiple 
members from various technical backgrounds. It is often split into multiple functional 
teams, which include the Technical Team, Past Performance Team, and Cost and Pricing 
Team. The role of this board is to assess the proposals against the evaluation criteria 
created in the solicitation phase. Finally, the SSAC, which is composed of a chair and 
team members, “provides a written comparative analysis and recommendations to the 
SSA” as well as maintaining oversight of the SSEB (OUSD, 2011). 
b. Evaluating Proposals 
The proposal evaluation portion of the source selection process can be very time 
consuming and very strenuous on members of the SSEB. During this process, it is critical 
that the team assess the correct criteria in their selection of the most qualified offeror. 
Comparable to other government acquisitions, cost or price is a mandatory factor in every 
source selection. Other criteria that accompany cost include, but are not limited to, “past 
performance, use of small business, financial strength, reputation, use of break through 
technologies, etc.” (Garrett & Parrott, 2007, p. 147).  
It is essential to ensure that the criteria are fairly assessed in the source selection 
process. Any missteps can open the door to a protest and in turn delay time-sensitive 
procurements. To aid the SSEB in utilizing the correct procedures, the DOD created 
standardized source selection procedures, which outline the different methodologies that 
can be utilized for the technical, risk, and past performance aspects of the evaluation 
process (OUSD, 2011). These methodologies include a combined technical and risk 
rating or a separate technical and risk rating process, both of which utilize a color-rating 
scheme. In addition to the technical evaluation, the team may also perform adjectival 
assessments of past performance and small business participation (OUSD, 2011).  
Once all evaluations have been completed, the SSEB provides their 
recommendation to the SSA. While the team decision should be heavily considered by 
the SSA, the final decision as to the apparent successful offeror rests solely with the SSA.  
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If the SSA chooses to go against the recommendations of the SSEB and SSAC (when 
applicable), he or she is justified in doing so but must document the decision to ensure a 
solid case for his or her finding. 
c. Clarifications, Communications, Discussions, and Revisions 
In accordance with FAR Part 15, the source selection process includes three levels 
of exchanges with offerors throughout certain phases of the procurement. When the 
government expects to award a contract without discussions, they utilize clarifications. 
This type of exchange is very limited in nature and allows the offeror to modify only 
minor administrative aspects of their proposal or clarify verbiage. Communications allow 
the government to interact with those offerors who are identified as potential candidates 
for the competitive range. This type of exchange gives the contractors the opportunity to 
address ambiguities and past performance information, but it does not allow the 
contractors to alter any portion of their proposal and ultimately helps the team to establish 
the competitive range (FAR 15.306, 2014). Upon establishment of the competitive range, 
the government can then enter into discussions with each of the remaining offerors to 
provide the best possible value for the acquisition. These types of discussions can include 
negotiating a better price and addressing deficiencies and weaknesses (FAR 15.306(d), 
2014). Once all forms of exchange have taken place, the remaining offerors are then 
allowed to provide the government with proposal revisions that address all issues 
discussed in the aforementioned exchanges and which can take place either before or 
after establishment of the competitive range (FAR 15.307, 2014). 
5. Contract Administration 
Even before the source selection process has concluded, it is wise to look ahead to 
the contract administration phase of the acquisition. In World Class Contracting, Garrett 
(2007) states, “The principal objective of contract administration is the same for both 
parties— to ensure the fulfillment of the contractual obligations by all the parties to the 
contract” (p. 162). To accomplish this objective, contract administration is accomplished 
through monitoring the contractor’s performance, performing any necessary 
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modifications to keep the project moving smoothly, and processing invoices and 
payments once items/services have been rendered.  
a. Monitoring and Measuring Performance 
Possibly the most under-appreciated portion of contract administration is the 
monitoring of contractor performance. This process ranges from small interactions that 
involve simply accepting contract items to large service contracts in which the 
contracting officer must appoint a Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) to 
consistently monitor the contractor’s performance. Frequently, issues can occur during 
the period of performance due to lack of training, disinterest, or lack of time on the part 
of the COR. As an example of this, a GAO report found that in many instances 
throughout 2011, large numbers of personnel held positions equivalent to that of a COR 
but required no formal COR training. These findings showed that while there was 
frequently a trained COR assigned to a specific contract, the physical monitoring was 
being conducted by personnel with little to no experience or training needed to correctly 
evaluate the performance of the contractor (GAO, 2012).  
b. Contract Modifications 
After the team has awarded the contract, there are still methods that can be used to 
remedy problems within the contract, from administrative changes to additions or 
deletions in terms or items within the scope of the contract (Chang, 2013). The FAR 
covers in depth these two methods within FAR Part 43 and defines them as bilateral and 
unilateral modifications. A bilateral modification is one that requires agreement and 
signature of both the contractor and the contracting officer and typically involves changes 
such as negotiated equitable adjustments, definitization of letter contracts, and 
modification of terms. Conversely, a unilateral modification is one that is simple in 
nature and can be signed by only the contracting officer. These can include administrative 
changes, change orders, and termination notices when needed.  
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c. Payment and Invoices 
Throughout the course of the contract, the government must pay for services or 
delivered items. While this step seems rather simple, it is nonetheless an important 
portion of contract administration, and the contracting officer must be familiar with the 
procedures involved in acceptance. Both invoicing and acceptance occur through 
submission of either a physical DD250, Material Inspection and Receiving Report, or 
electronically via Wide Area Workflow (WAWF). To process timely payment, the 
contractor must know how to correctly submit the invoices, and the responsible 
government official must validate the submission to ensure payment. Yet again, the COR 
is a principal participant in this process as he or she is normally the government official 
designated to accept delivery of supplies or services and ensure that there are no issues 
with the delivered products. 
6. Contract Closeout 
Contract closeout is the sixth and final phase within the contracting process and is 
often the most overlooked and undervalued. In Contract Administration, this phase is 
described as one where the contracting office verifies “that all administrative matters are 
concluded on a contract that is otherwise physically complete” (Garrett, 2009, p. 21). 
This step in the process is largely performed through the closeout process but can be 
prematurely terminated for a variety of reasons ranging from lack of progress by the 
contractor to a cancellation due to lack of funding from the government.  
a. Terminations 
It would be naïve to believe that all contracts come to a successful completion and 
that there are never any issues that preclude an early end to a government contract. 
Terminations provide the contracting officer with two very valuable tools in discharging 
the contract prematurely—termination for convenience (T4C) and termination for default 
(T4D). In the simplest terms, T4C allows the government to opt out of a contract at its 
convenience with no additional compensation due to the contractor and no penalty 
incurred (beyond costs and profit already accrued). T4D, on the other hand, is normally 
executed when the contractor continually performs below standards and is thereby 
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terminated (Garrett, 2009). In accordance with FAR Part 49, this type of termination can 
incur various penalties by the contractor, including but not limited to, unfavorable 
information within past performance records, monetary withholdings, liquidated 
damages, and increased bond premiums in the case of construction contracts (FAR 49.4). 
b. Closeout 
As noted in FAR 4.804, closeout is essentially the process of ensuring that the 
contract is “physically complete,” all important issues have been addressed, and all 
unsettled costs and audits have been resolved (FAR, 2014). Depending on the terms of 
the contract, it is during this phase that any remaining money may be de-obligated by the 
government and returned. As previously mentioned, closeout is one of the most 
overlooked steps within the contracting process, yet it is also one that has gained much 
attention within the past decade. With growing concerns over sequestration and lack of 
funding within the DOD, closeout has been a hot-button topic within the last few years. 
Due to a huge backlog of physically completed contracts and money that has either 
expired or is getting ready to expire, there are millions of dollars that could possibly be 
recouped by accomplishing the closeout process in a more expedient manner (GAO, 
2012). With such a detailed process, it is essential for the contract professional to ensure 
that they have a mature procurement process (Rendon & Rendon, 2014). It is merely one 
piece of the puzzle, however, and must go in tandem with strong internal controls, which 
is discussed next. 
C. INTERNAL CONTROL FRAMEWORK 
Just as the six phases of contracting are important to the acquisition process, 
internal control within the government is important to the sustainment of the organization 
as a whole. According to the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO), internal control is defined as “a process, effected by an entity’s 
board of directors, management, and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the achievement of objectives relating to operations, reporting, and 
compliance” (COSO, 2013, p. 3). The objective of this framework is to focus on three 
broad categories: Operations, Reporting, and Compliance. The internal control 
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framework provides management at all levels with the tools necessary to ensure a 
reasonable assurance of security and risk mitigation within the organization. The internal 
control framework was developed by the COSO in 1992 and was updated in 2013 in 
order to modernize their strategies. Additionally, these changes helped cement the 
concepts discussed within the framework by introducing them as 17 distinct principles 
distributed across the five components that are shown in Figure 3. To ensure that the 
government was keeping pace with industry regarding internal controls, the GAO also 
released its own updated version of the framework in 2014 entitled Standards for Internal 
Control in the Federal Government, which outlines the way that the framework is utilized 
within the government (GAO, 2014). The following sections will discuss the five 
components of the COSO internal control integrated framework, including the 17 
principles, as can be seen in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.  Internal Control Components (from COSO, 2013; GAO, 2014) 
1. Control Environment 
Any strong organization must begin with a strong foundation. As the first 
component of internal control, the control environment fulfills exactly this role. Ramos 
(2004) states that the control environment is the foundation for all other components and 
sets the tone for the organization, and therefore, must not be neglected. The upper-tier 
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management and board of directors utilize the control environment at a strategic level to 
set the tone for the organization and emphasize the first five principles stressed in the 
updated framework. These principles consist of: “1. Determining commitment to integrity 
and ethical values, 2. Exercising oversight responsibility, 3. Establishing structure, 
responsibility and authority, 4. Demonstrating commitment to competence, and 5. 
Enforcing accountability” (GAO, 2014, p. 9). These five principles work in tandem with 
the organization’s original vision by showing that the upper-tier officials have a vested 
interest in creating a control environment that works optimally. This show of solidarity 
enforces the concept of a strong foundation upon which to build. 
2. Risk Assessment 
Risk is considered to be an everyday part of life. It is a part of life, however, that 
people and organizations attempt to mitigate to provide the best possible product to their 
customers and stakeholders. Risks can either be internal to the organization or produced 
by some external force that affects the entity directly or indirectly. According to Cain 
(2009), many of these risks can be reduced through better employment of traditional type 
audits that allow management to make more informed decisions. In order to determine 
the appropriate amount of risk the organization is willing to accept, management can 
utilize the following four principles: “6. Define objectives and risk tolerances, 7. Identify, 
analyze, and respond to risk, 8. Assess fraud risk, 9. Identify, analyze, and respond to 
significant changes in the internal control system” (GAO, 2014, p. 9). By incorporating 
these principles, management can better recognize their significant risks and either 
control, mitigate, or avoid them altogether. 
3. Control Activities 
Control activities are management-level decisions and actions that are established 
“through policies and procedures to achieve objectives and respond to risk in the internal 
control system, which includes the entity’s information system” (GAO, 2014, p. 44). 
Similar to senior executives who implement controls at the environment level, the control 
activities allow the mid-to-upper-level management to have a stake in the internal 
controls process. According to Gramling, Hermanson, Hermanson, and Ye (2010), one 
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way to enhance control activities is through segregation of duties. By dividing activities 
amongst several people in an organization, segregation of duties reduces the risk of 
personal gain or fraudulent activity by any one individual. The three principles associated 
with control activities are: “10. Design control activities, 11. Design activities for the 
information system, and 12. Implement control activities” (GAO, 2014, p. 9).  
4. Information and Communication 
Communicating is a staple of any successful organization, and it is imperative that 
employees relay information promptly and correctly. The principles associated with this 
internal control component assist the employee in employing a sound strategy when it 
comes to information and communication and instruct them to: “13. Use quality 
information, 14. Communicate internally, and 15. Communicate externally” (GAO, 2014, 
p. 9). In today’s technologically advanced environment, it is imperative that every 
individual knows which mechanism to utilize when communicating and passing 
information back and forth. Examples of this include the use of e-mail versus verbal 
communication in some instances where the information can be misinterpreted or if the 
person simply wants a written record that their intent was communicated to the other 
individual. In addition to communication in the traditional sense, Alie Eid (2008) states 
that it is extremely important that accounting information systems (AIS) are utilized in a 
manner that allows for strategic use and is commensurate with the needs of the 
organization. Ali Eid (2008) also states that AISs are crucial for communicating data both 
internally and externally in the form of reporting data, financial statements, and trend 
analysis.   
5. Monitoring Activities 
Hedley and Ben-Chorin (2011) state that effective monitoring activities are a very 
important tool that can provide an organization with self-appraisal in real time rather than 
having to wait for audit results that occur after the fact. Similar to any other program 
implemented within a company, it is imperative to have a monitoring activity to ensure 
that the previously discussed controls are being implemented as intended and to ensure a 
feedback loop is established. The feedback loop allows management to determine 
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whether the controls are functioning correctly or if they need to be tweaked to provide a 
quality system of controls. Therefore, it is not surprising that the final two principles are: 
“16. Performing monitoring activities, and 17. Remediating deficiencies” (GAO, 2014, p. 
9). These principles allow management to establish a baseline, monitor internal controls, 
evaluate results, report and evaluate issues and perform corrective actions. Each of these 
principles within the five components of internal control contribute considerably to 
reduced risk of procurement fraud. When these principles are not effectively 
implemented, however, there is always potential for fraud and the schemes associated 
with fraudulent activity.  
D. PROCUREMENT FRAUD SCHEME CATEGORIES 
This research study focused on the six most common categories in procurement 
fraud: collusion; conflict of interest; bid rigging; billing, cost and pricing schemes; 
fraudulent purchases; and fraudulent representation. The Department of Justice (DOJ) 
reported that, in FY2012, the government recouped a record high $4.9 billion (B) in cases 
that involved fraud against the government under the False Claims Act (DOJ, 2014). In 
addition, between 2009 and 2012, the DOJ recovered $13.3B, also a record high (DOJ, 
2014). In a time when federal funding has significantly decreased and there are more 
contractors bidding for fewer contracts, the opportunity for fraud has no doubt increased 
due to the financial strains felt by the large pool of contractors (Lander, Kimball, & 
Martyn, 2008). Additionally, sequestration can negatively affect the government in terms 
of funding oversight of programs, such as is the case with the Medicare program. Spar 
found that though mandatory programs such as Medicare and Medicaid were exempt 
from cuts, “some of the administrative functions, including fraud and abuse and quality 
oversight activities, that do not qualify as “Medicare benefits” are subject to reductions 
higher than 2% (5.0% and 5.1% for discretionary and mandatory funding respectively in 
FY2013)” (Spar, 2013, p. 15).  
1. Collusion 
In broad terms, collusion is defined by Merriam-Webster as “a secret agreement 
or cooperation especially for an illegal purpose” (Merriam-Webster, 2014). In the world 
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of government contracting, collusion can occur in various ways. However, for the 
purpose of this section, this research study focuses on collusion between the government 
official and a contractor. Within its Fraud Indicator Handbook, Air Force Materiel 
Command identifies 39 different variations of collusion with the contractor, including the 
“frequent use of a contractor despite quality, cost or performance problems” and 
“apparent buyer favoritism for a particular contractor” (2008, pp. 45–46). With all of the 
large-dollar contracts being sought, it is reasonable to expect that there are government 
officials who see the potential for personal profit and assist prospective contractors in 
winning contract awards in return for bribes, special favors, or kickbacks. One recent 
example of this is the 2013 arrest of three Navy personnel for accepting bribes from a 
contractor in return for directing business to them. The accusations included millions of 
dollars of overcharging and leaking classified shipping routes in exchange for lavish gifts 
for the members. What makes this incident an even larger concern is that those arrested 
were higher-level Navy officers with additional flag-level officers being implicated in the 
scandal (Ferran, 2013).  
2. Conflict of Interest 
While collusion seems to be the type of fraud that gains most notoriety throughout 
the media, conflict of interest is another type of fraud that can also be very damaging to 
the government. According to Husser, Gautier, Andre, and Lespinet-Najib (2014), 
conflicts of interest can force a buyer to “choose between personal interests and the 
interests of the company he represents” (p. 328). In the case of procurement fraud, 
conflicts of interest have the potential to arise during the source selection process when a 
member of the source selection team may have interests, financial or other, in one of the 
offerors. This conflict, whether actual or potential, may hinder the government official’s 
judgment during the evaluation and selection process if the conflict is not resolved before 
the process has begun (U.S. Office of Government Ethics [OGE], 2013). In accordance 
with statute 18 U.S.C. § 208, “employees are prohibited from participating personally or 
substantially, in an official capacity, in any ‘particular matter’ that would have a direct 
and predictable effect on the employee’s own financial interests” or those of significantly 
close ties (U.S. OGE Current Government Employees, 2013). Within the source selection 
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process, all members must sign conflict of interest statements to certify whether or not 
they hold an interest with competing organizations. If they do hold an interest in a 
competing organization, they must recuse themselves to prevent the appearance of 
favoritism.  
3. Bid Rigging 
When two or more contractors collude to bypass competition, it is known as bid 
rigging. This type of fraud can be seen through bid suppression, complementary bidding, 
bid rotation, and subcontracting. In bid suppression, all contractors agree that only one 
contractor will bid to receive the discounted contract award. Similar to this is 
complementary bidding, where all competitors but the designated one overbid or present 
unacceptable terms. This gives the appearance of competition but instead significantly 
increases the price for the government (Haberbush, 2000). Bid rotation allows contractors 
to pick and choose which contracts are awarded to which vendor by disclosing what their 
bid will be. Finally, subcontracting can pose a threat in that the low contractor will 
withdraw if the other will hire them as a subcontractor (DOJ, 2013). 
4. Billing, Cost, and Pricing Schemes 
According to the General Services Administration Office of the Inspector General 
(GSAOIG), yet another scheme that has been noted within contract processes is that of 
mischarging for costs, which includes charging for products not used or services not 
rendered (GSAOIG, 2012). This type of fraud is usually perpetrated once the contractor 
has been awarded the contract and misrepresents their costs through various methods. 
These methods can include inflated rates for labor, intentionally charging indirect labor 
as direct labor, and price gouging. While charging indirect labor as direct does not seem 
to be an egregious infraction, it can become a significant issue if the contractor utilizes 
this labor across other contracts. A recent example of this type of abuse was brought to 
light in 2013 when two employees of an international moving company filed a lawsuit 
against their employer for overstating weights involved with the movement of military 
household goods (Hawes, 2014). According to the documents filed, there are 437 
instances of fraud indicators on a contract, which has equaled $723 million (M) over four 
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years (Hawes, 2014). These types of schemes seem to be the most difficult to detect due 
to the fact that the government has very little insight on the inner workings of another 
organization’s financial books; and therefore, must rely on internal employees to blow 
the whistle. 
5. Fraudulent Purchases 
Fraudulent purchases are those in which a buyer acquires materials without 
having a specific government requirement but rather for personal use. These purchases 
seemingly became a major issue with the introduction and increased use of the 
government purchase card (GPC) throughout the early 2000s. Multiple GAO reports 
between 2002 and 2003 specified that every service component was vulnerable to 
fraudulent purchases due to weak internal controls (GAO, 2002).  
Procurement fraud still remains an issue within the commercial sector as well as 
the federal government, and is seen by many to be a growing concern (Nesti, 2014). For 
example, the Environmental Protection Agency (2014) found that it lacked proper 
internal controls, which resulted in improper or otherwise prohibited purchases in over 50 
percent of sampled transactions during an audit spanning January through November 
2013. Some of the missing controls included purchase card oversight and proper 
employee training (EPA, 2014).  
6. Fraudulent Representation 
The final type of scheme identified within this research is fraudulent 
representation, which consists of substituting goods and services for cheaper or 
substandard merchandise that does not conform to contract specifications. This process is 
also known as product substitution. One of the most infamous of these cases included a 
subcontractor who was providing electronic tubes to the prime that were below 
specification but bore the markings of the originally specified product. The contractor 
then used the tubes within the radio kits that were delivered to the government. While the 
prime contractor claimed that they did not know of this infraction, both organizations 
were held liable after company employees for the subcontractor filed a lawsuit under the 
false claims act (United States v. Bornstein, 1976).  
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Many times, these product substitutions cause much more than financial damage. 
Within the government, utilizing substandard products can also put lives at risk when the 
procurement involves products that could jeopardize the safety of those working on them. 
Much like billing schemes, fraudulent representation is difficult for the government to 
identify due to the fact that substitutions are made on internal components, or the 
contractor deceives the government through false representation of the product, as shown 
in the Bornstein case. 
All of the types of fraud schemes previously mentioned can be seen within the 
fraud matrix in Figure 4. The matrix shows that a possibility for fraud exists at any time 
throughout the contracting process and that all components of the internal control 
framework are vulnerable to fraudulent activity. However, with proper procurement 
training processes and effective internal controls, the potential for loss involving 
fraudulent activity can be greatly reduced. According to Rendon and Rendon (in press), 
in order to thwart these schemes and minimize vulnerabilities within the organization, 
effective internal controls, capable processes, and a competent contracting workforce 
must be implemented, measured and constantly improved.  
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Figure 4.  Procurement Fraud Matrix (from Rendon & Rendon, in press) 
While procurement fraud can be seen throughout every aspect of contracting, it is 
important to note that Department of Defense contracting is a high-visibility target for 
fraudsters due to the large budget and high number of contract actions performed by the 
DOD. The next section will discuss DOD contracting.  
E. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTING 
According to the GAO, the DOD contracted for approximately $361B worth of 
goods and services in FY2012 alone (2013). These contracts ranged anywhere from 
simple buys such as office supplies to high-complexity acquisitions to include large-
dollar weapons systems. With such a large mission and an increasing need for properly 
trained contracting personnel, it comes as no surprise that the area of DOD contract 
management has been included on the GAO’s biennial High Risk Series since 1992 
(GAO, 2013). According to Apte, Apte, and Rendon (2010), “this high-risk status reflects 
DOD’s challenges in achieving its desired outcomes in terms of meeting service 
procurement cost, schedule, and performance objectives” (p. 11). These issues, along 
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with a lack of strategic approach, leaves the government at risk of not getting the services 
and products when needed, or a possibility of paying too much (GAO, 2013). 
Additionally, in its FY2014 Audit Plan, the DOD Inspector General (DODIG) reported 
the deficiencies that continue to plague contract management, including “obtaining 
adequate competition in contracts, adequately defining contract requirements, overseeing 
contract performance, obtaining fair and reasonable prices, and maintaining contract 
documentation for contract payments” (DODIG, 2013, p. ii). According to this same 
report, these deficiencies, along with the 13 internal control weaknesses found in 
concurrent years, ultimately degrade the DOD’s ability to identify fraud, waste, and 
abuse (DODIG, 2013). Contracting responsibilities have grown exponentially throughout 
the past decade due to support of contingency operations spanning multiple continents, 
increasing workloads, and decreasing personnel. Due to this, the DOD is constantly at 
risk of being exploited by those who are looking to defraud the government for a 
multitude of reasons.  
1. Impact of Fraud on the DOD 
Procurement fraud significantly impacts the DOD due to the fact that our 
government budgets are shrinking, and government personnel are asked to do more with 
less due to sequestration. Between FY2012 and FY2013, the total dollars spent on DOD 
contracting decreased by $53M and transactions decreased from 1.4M to 1.3M in that 
same time span (Office of Management and Budget [OMB], 2013). The DOD, along with 
every other government agency, relies heavily on contractor support in order to 
accomplish its mission, and the U.S. government is spending less due to budget cuts. This 
fact alone makes it essential to safeguard government resources and ensure that the 
government partners with trusted contractors who look to have a mutually beneficial 
relationship with the government. The auditability triangle (Figure 5) presents three 
important factors that must be addressed in order to create an auditable organization. 
According to Rendon and Rendon (in press), auditability includes competent personnel 
who are educated, trained and experienced, on both the contractor and government side 
of the contract management process. Additionally, the acquisition organizations must 
have capable processes set in place that do not remain stagnant but rather continue to 
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improve and ensure that the correct processes are being measured. Finally, auditability 
also entails having effective internal controls where the organization ensures that the 
controls remain dynamic, the controls are constantly monitored and enforced, and that 
issues are reported in a timely manner. (Rendon & Rendon, in press). 
 
Figure 5.  Auditability Triangle (from Rendon & Rendon, in press) 
2. Procurement Fraud Problems within the DOD 
The DOD has seen its share of problems within the last decade, including 
inadequate training, lack of personnel, increased spending, and increased workload. DOJ 
reports (2013) state that the government recovered $427M for goods and services 
purchased by the DOD in FY2012 alone. The recoupment came via settlements from civil 
false claims act cases. While a majority of the fraudulent activities took place in a non-
contingency environment, the report attributed $73M of the recovered funds to contracts 
performed in operations within Iraq and Afghanistan and involved well-known large 
contractors (DOJ, 2013). The lack of capable processes and effective internal controls has 
likely contributed to this large number by making it easier for fraudsters to target 
government contracts using procurement fraud schemes. 
While external threats seem to account for most procurement fraud within the 
government, there have been instances where internal government officials have taken 
advantage of their positions in order to defraud the government. According to a DOJ 
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report (2014), one case in 2013 involved two high-level Navy officers, a well-connected 
Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) agent, and a petty officer. These men 
allegedly conspired with the owner of an overseas defense contractor by driving business 
directly to his company in exchange for gifts and favors. The report asserts that the 
conspirators not only caused monetary risk to the government but, in the case of Petty 
Officer Layug, also divulged classified information as to the routes and schedules of the 
vessels that they commanded.  
In another case of insider threat, a retired USAF officer was indicted in 2013 for 
his involvement in contract fraud amounting to approximately $5.4M (USAO, 2013). 
According to the United States Attorney’s Office (2013), a retired military officer and 
current contractor employee for the government provided insider knowledge and 
sensitive proprietary information to his associates in order for them to obtain lucrative 
government contracts. Due to these high-visibility scenarios within the last two to three 
years, the DOD has taken note and outlined specific steps to address the issues that are 
facing the federal government. The following section will discuss the DOD’s response to 
fraud issues. 
F. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE TO FRAUD ISSUES 
In response to GAO’s high-risk report published in 2013, DOD has attempted to 
correct many of the issues addressed within the report. GAO (2013) noted that one of the 
largest steps that DOD has taken included increasing the acquisition workforce by 
approximately 17,500 over a two-year span between FY2009 and FY2011. With the 
implementation of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund (DAWDF), 
DOD created yet another tool to facilitate “the capacity in both personnel and skills 
needed to perform its acquisition mission, provide appropriate oversight of contractor 
performance, and ensure that the Department receives best value for expenditure of 
public resources” (DAWDF, 2012, p. 931). Through the use of this fund, the acquisition 
workforce will not only grow, but also be better trained to identify potential indicators of 
fraud, waste, and abuse. According to a 2011 report by the GAO, however, many key 
roles in services acquisition are not performed by members of the acquisition workforce 
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(GAO, 2011). Additionally, the DOD has not expanded the definition of acquisition 
workforce to include installation-level services stakeholders such as requirements 
generators and Contracting Officer’s Representatives (CORs). Finally, though DOD has 
increased the number of personnel within the acquisition workforce and has increased 
training, there has been no response from DOD which is focused on ensuring capable 
processes or promoting effective internal controls. The following section will address the 
consequences of contracting deficiencies. 
G. CONSEQUENCES OF CONTRACTING DEFICIENCIES 
In today’s time of fiscal uncertainty and shrinking budgets, the importance of a 
competent contracting workforce cannot be overstated. The contracting deficiencies that 
can potentially lead to fraud hold not only monetary implications, but can also threaten 
security and place undue risk to the government in certain circumstances due to 
ineffective internal controls or less than capable contracting processes. Throughout the 
U.S. government, the Justice Department was able to recover almost $5B via False 
Claims Act settlements and judgments attributed to fraud (DOJ, 2012). This number is 
merely what was recovered from guilty organizations sued under the Act and most likely 
is only a percentage of what has actually been stolen from the government due to 
deficiencies and mismanagement of government practices and processes. Deficiencies 
within the procurement process not only invite the potential for fraud, but in many cases 
result in wasted resources due to cost overruns, lack of competition, lack of process 
capability, and improper incentives provided to contractors. The following section will 
discusss the fraud coverage in courses offered by the Defense Acquisition University 
(DAU). 
H. FRAUD COVERAGE WITHIN DEFENSE ACQUISITION UNIVERSITY  
As described in the previous sections, fraud has become an increasing issue 
within the federal government and more specifically within the DOD. Cohen and 
Eimicke (2008) state that as outsourcing increases within government organizations, so 
too does the possibility for corruption. This possibility for fraud is further intensified by 
“clash of cultures” identified by the authors, in which the goal of the public servant is to 
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“serve the public interest” while the contractor’s primary goal is profitability. The fact 
that the DOD acquisition workforce is composed of public servants, paired with the 
issues facing the department, leads to the question of: What is the procurement fraud 
coverage within the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) courses for acquisition 
professionals? 
While DOD contracting professionals are required to take certain courses to 
receive their Level I, Level II and Level III certifications, none of the required core 
courses for contracting professionals include a mandatory fraud training or awareness 
class. This research performed a focused search for “fraud” as a key word within the 
course descriptions of all available course offerings within DAU. While there were some 
instances of “fraud” found within the catalog, there were only two instances in which the 
course was devoted to fraud. The only formal class offered by DAU that specifically 
covers procurement fraud is an auditing class: AUD 1283—Fraud Awareness. According 
to the course description, this course provides the student with “an overview of the 
auditor’s responsibility for the consideration of fraud in DCAA’s audits and to heighten 
auditor awareness of the possibility of fraudulent activities” (DAU iCatalog, 2014). 
Along with this, the objective of AUD 1283 is to “describe fraud, including the fraud 
triangle and the fraud laws relevant to government contracting” (DAU iCatalog, 2014). 
The course is not targeted towards contracting professionals, however, but rather is 
intended for DCAA auditors. It is a required course for auditing professionals. It is an 
online self-study course that takes approximately 6.5 hours.  
Along with AUD 1283, a continuous learning module (CLM) provides students 
with a two-hour refresher course. CLM 049—Procurement Fraud Indicators, is a 
computer-based, self-study course that is targeted at all acquisition workforce members. 
The course description states that CLM 049 is intended to “provide an awareness of 
procurement fraud indicators” (DAU iCatalog, 2014). Unlike the AUD course, this CLM 
was developed under the direction of Congress specifically to target all acquisition 
workforce personnel in response to findings of a department-wide review concerning 
fraud, waste, and abuse. While the CLM provides the contracting workforce with 
additional training, it is not a course required by the DAU curriculum. 
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I. SUMMARY 
This literature review laid a foundation for better understanding of the contract 
management process, the five components of the internal control framework, and the six 
most common procurement fraud schemes perpetrated in contracting, specifically, within 
DOD procurement. In addition, a summary of the impact of fraud and problems within 
the DOD was discussed. The department’s response to fraud issues and the possible 
future consequences caused by contracting deficiencies was addressed. Finally, the 
chapter discussed the level of fraud training coverage provided through DAU. This 
overall framework serves as a foundation for the research presented within later chapters 
and provides a background of the research. The issues addressed are pertinent within any 
organization and can be implemented throughout almost any type of organization. The 
next chapter will introduce the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC) as well as 














III. AIR FORCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS CENTER 
CONTRACTING DIVISION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an in-depth look at the organization that will be the case 
study for this research. According to its mission statement, the mission of the Air Force 
Nuclear Weapons Center Contracting Division (AFNWC/PZ) is to “execute business 
solutions for the nuclear enterprise, installation, and mission partners and develop, 
implement, and manage compliant contracts responsive to customer needs and providing 
best value to the Air Force” (Widmann, 2014). As is the case with many other contracting 
organizations, AFNWC/PZ is responsible to many organizations that range from the 
internal government customer to the taxpayers. The span of their contracts ranges from 
every-day small dollar commodity and service buys in support of base operations to 
complex multi-billion-dollar missile procurement. As such a diverse organization 
responsible for many types of acquisitions, the AFNWC is a subordinate unit within the 
Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC). This chapter will describe the organization of 
AFMC, as well as the contracting directorate makeup within the Center. Additionally, it 
will discuss the personnel and operations within the contracting directorate.  
B. AIR FORCE MATERIEL COMMAND ORGANIZATION 
Similar to every other component within the DOD, the 2011 Budget Control Act 
forced the AFMC to eliminate civilian positions in order to decrease Operations and 
Maintenance (O&M) spending. In an effort to streamline and better re-align Air Force 
priorities, AFMC recently incorporated a mass restructuring effort where they downsized 
a 12-center organization and consolidated into a five-center construct model. According 
to a RAND study conducted in 2012, this new structure allowed AFMC to reduce its span 
of control and consolidate redundant functions such as organizing, training, and 
equipping by placing them under one commander (RAND, 2012).  
In the process of combining centers, 10 centers were eliminated, and three new 
centers were introduced (the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC), the 
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Air Force Sustainment Center (AFSC), and the Air Force Test Center (AFTC)) (Figure 
6). As a result of the restructuring effort, the RAND report (2012) found that the 
reorganization would eliminate more than 1,000 unnecessary positions and save more 
than $100M annually. All the while, the AFNWC remained intact, though its internal 
organizational structure also faced changes due to a need for decreased manning.  
 
Figure 6.  AFMC 5 Center Structure (from RAND, 2012)  
C. AFNWC CONTRACTING DIRECTORATE ORGANIZATION 
While the mass reorganization at the major command (MAJCOM) level did not 
affect the AFNWC in name, it did affect the way that it was organized. Similar to their 
parent unit, the Air Force forced AFNWC to minimize inefficiencies and merge 
redundant processes in order to accommodate the mandatory personnel cuts faced by the 
DOD. The AFNWC Contracting Directorate (AFNWC/PZ) formed from the merger of 
the 377 Contracting Squadron (377CONS) and Ogden Air Logistics Center Contracting 
(OO-ALC/PK). This merger allowed AFNWC to incorporate installation-level 
contracting (377CONS) and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) weapons 
contracting (OO-ALC/PK) under the same span of control and reduce the number of 
personnel assigned (AFNWC/PZ, 2014).  
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The Contracting Division within AFWNC is headquartered at Kirtland Air Force 
Base (KAFB), New Mexico and is broken down into a staff and three subordinate 
divisions, each with its own specific functions and customers (Figure 7). AFNWC/PK 
staff is responsible for oversight, resource management, and contracting execution and is 
based at KAFB. It is assigned the PK designation rather than PZ due to manpower 
requirements. AFNWC/PZC directly supports the staff through clearance and review 
functions for the two operational divisions (PZI & PZB). AFNWC/PZI is responsible for 
installation contracting and comprises areas such as support and services, construction 
support, and enterprise/specialized contracting. Finally, AFNWC/PZB focuses directly on 
support of the ICBM mission. This division is geographically separated from its parent 




Figure 7.  AFNWC/PZ Organization Chart (from AFNWC/PZ, 2014) 
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D. AFNWC/PZ PERSONNEL 
The Director of AFNWC/PZ is a colonel within the 64P career field (Contracting 
Air Force Specialty Code) with a workforce mix of civilian and military. The Contracting 
Directorate (PZ) consists of 84 civilian personnel authorizations within the 1102 career 
field (Civilian Contracting Classification Standard) and approximately 20 military 
personnel within the 64P and 6C contracting career fields (AFNWC/PZ, 2014). The 
majority of these professionals are assigned as contract specialists, while a small minority 
with more time and experience within the career field are bestowed a warrant, authorizing 
them to award contracts. The contracting specialist is normally a less experienced 
employee who is responsible for the day-to-day administrative actions associated with the 
contract with no authority to enter into a binding contract. After gaining experience and 
approval from superiors, the contracting specialist can then receive a warrant that, in 
accordance with the FAR, grants them “the authority to enter into, administer, and/or 
terminate contracts and make related determinations and findings” (FAR, 2014).  
E. AFNWC/PZ OPERATIONS 
The span of control for contracting support provided by the AFNWC/PZ covers a 
large spectrum due to the fact that the organization is focused more on providing support 
to each specific nuclear customer rather than on a single aspect of contracting. PZI 
contains multiple branches within the directorate that are dedicated to purely operational 
contracting support, which includes minor construction as well as all services and 
supplies necessary to enable the installation to function on a day-to-day basis. According 
to the Director of Contracting for AFNWC (2014), in FY2013 this division was 
responsible for over 1,000 contract actions valued at approximately $50M. On the other 
side of the spectrum, PZB consists of all functions necessary to support the ICBM 
mission to include engineering services, sustainment, and future acquisitions. In contrast 
to the operational division, the ICBM division performed far fewer contract actions in 
FY2013 (600) yet obligated far more dollars (approximately $400M). Although these two 
divisions perform significantly different contracting missions, both organizations fall 
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underneath the umbrella of the AFNWC Contracting Division, and therefore, are subject 
to the same federal, DOD, and Air Force contracting regulations. 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a broad look at the AFNWC’s parent organization, AFMC, 
to provide reference to its responsibilities to the Air Force. Also, it outlined the makeup 
of the AFNWC organization. Finally, this chapter presented the operations conducted by 
AFNWC/PZ as well as its organizational structure breakdown and personnel. The next 
chapter will discuss the methodology used in this research study. It will discuss the 







This chapter will discuss the methodology used in this research study. First, the 
development of the survey assessment tool will be discussed. Then, the deployment of 
the assessment tool will be addressed. Finally, this chapter will detail how the results 
collected from the survey will be analyzed based on multiple factors. These factors 
include the knowledge level of procurement fraud related to the contract management 
process, the internal control components, and the procurement fraud scheme categories. 
Additionally, the survey will analyze the contracting officials’ perceptions of 
procurement fraud vulnerabilities. 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF ASSESSMENT TOOL 
The purpose of the survey instrument used in this study is to measure contracting 
personnel’s knowledge level of procurement fraud. The survey will be taken by personnel 
with a variety of experience within AFWNW/PZ. It has several multiple-choice questions 
that assess a participant’s specific level of procurement fraud knowledge. The survey 
questions were developed in a previous thesis (Chang, 2013) and deployed to a different 
group of participants for this research study. According to Chang (2013),  
The aim was to base these questions on a general knowledge of fraud 
schemes and not on any information listed in regulations. The questions 
were developed for each phase of the contract management process and 
further identified according to their associated internal control component 
and procurement fraud scheme. The survey also included Likert scale 
questions dealing with organizational environment and fraud (p. 31).  
1. Sources Used to Develop Questions 
As previously mentioned, the questions were developed in a previous study 
(Chang, 2013) and were utilized by this current research study. According to Chang 
(2013), the main source used to develop the survey was the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), Office of the Inspector General, Office of Investigation’s Fraud 
Indicators Handbook. The “handbook lists various indicators of procurement fraud that 
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will help government employees in recognizing procurement fraud. The handbook breaks 
down indicators based on schemes, contracting phase, and personnel conducting the 
fraud” (Chang, 2013, p. 31). The DOD’s Office of Inspector General’s report 
Contingency Contracting: A Framework for Reform, 2012 update (Department of 
Defense Inspector General [DODIG], 2012) was also used to develop the survey 
questions. Chang (2013) states that the two reports are similar because they both contain 
“lists of fraud indicators as organized by various phases in the contracting process, but it 
also provides concrete examples of fraud occurrences” (p. 32). Chang (2013) also utilized 
some of the organizational Likert scale questions from the Internal Control Survey 
developed by the New York State Internal Control Association (NYSICA, 2006) and also 
used the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) contract and procurement 
fraud data (ACFE, 2013). 
2. Development of Demographic Questions 
Using the previously developed survey instrument, the demographic questions 
were designed to collect information about those participating in the survey. The survey 
includes a range of questions that asks whether they are civilian or military, what their 
experience is within the contracting field, whether they currently hold a Contracting 
Officer warrant, and what their Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
(DAWIA) certification level is (Chang, 2013). 
3. Development of Knowledge Questions 
According to Chang (2013), the survey was developed to measure the level of 
procurement fraud knowledge among the participants “according to each of the six 
contract phases, five internal control components, and six procurement fraud schemes (p. 
32). The questions assessed the participants’ pre-existing knowledge of contracting. The 
survey provided participants with examples of fraud situations and asked them to identify 
the scenario in fraud terms. “The questions were developed from the various fraud 
indicators listed in government reports and other resources. All of the 27 knowledge 
questions were multiple-choice format, with four possible answers (Chang, 2013, p. 32). 
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4. Development of Organizational Perception Questions 
In addition to demographics and general knowledge questions, the previously 
developed survey asked participants 12 questions about their organization. These 
questions used the Likert scale to assess what participants thought about their 
organization’s susceptibility to fraudulent activity (Chang, 2013). Additionally, the 
organizational questions assessed each participant’s attitude towards the occurrence of 
fraud in their organization. 
5. Deployment of Assessment Tool 
The previously developed survey, using the LimeSurvey web-based tool, was 
deployed directly to the contracting personnel at AFNWC/PZ via an e-mail message from 
the researchers. The participants were given four weeks to complete the survey and were 
told that the survey would take approximately 30–45 minutes to complete. Each survey 
was taken at the participant’s desk during work hours. The survey targeted contracting 
workforce members employed within AFNWC/PZ. The personnel included 13 military 
members within the 64P Air Force Specialty Code and 19 civilian members within the 
1102 career field (64P and 1102 are designators for Contracting career field). The total 
number of possible participants was 99. The participants were primarily comprised of 
contract specialists and several warranted contracting officers, all with different levels of 
contracting ability. The researchers sent a follow-up e-mail two weeks after the start of 
the survey to remind participants to complete the survey if they had not done so already, 
as well as a final email at the end of the four weeks to allow the participants a chance to 
complete the survey. 
C. ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS (DATA ANALYSIS) 
The data collected from the survey was reviewed using descriptive statistics. The 
research team analyzed survey results for patterns and potential correlations among the 
demographics. The survey results were analyzed by contract management phases, internal 
control components, and procurement fraud schemes. All of these were assessed to see 
which phase, component, or fraud scheme had the highest susceptibility to fraud within 
the organization (Chang, 2013, p. 33). The research team paid particular attention to the 
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questions that were most missed among the participants. The missed questions were also 
compared to the participant’s demographics (e.g., employment status, DAWIA 
certification level, and years of experience). Finally, lack of fraud coverage within the 
DAU curriculum was referenced in correlation with missed questions.  
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the methodology used in this research study, including the 
use of the previously developed survey assessment tool, the deployment of the 
assessment tool to the AFNWC Contracting Directorate, and how the results collected 
from the survey will be analyzed. The following chapter will present the analysis of the 




V. FINDINGS, ANALYSIS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results from the survey responses. The results include 
demographic data, knowledge question data, and organizational perception data. The 
results are broken down by contract management phases, internal control components, 
and procurement fraud schemes. The organizational perception questions data is also 
analyzed. Based on the analysis, recommendations are presented for improving 
contracting knowledge for personnel based on the survey findings on procurement fraud. 
B. ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS 
The survey included questions that allowed the respondents to input demographic 
information. This information would allow researchers to identify a possible correlation 
between knowledge level and demographic identifiers such as employment category, 
experience level (in years), DAWIA certification level, and whether the participants held 
a Contracting Officer’s Warrant. 
1. Survey Response 
The survey was opened to participants on 22 July 2014 and remained open and 
available until 20 September 2014. Of the 99 potential participants, there were 32 survey 
participants that completed the survey within this time period, resulting in a 32 percent 
response rate for the organization. There were eight participants that opened the survey 
but did not complete it; therefore, their responses were not included in the analysis. The 
survey was released during the fiscal end of year, one of the busiest times of year for 
contracting personnel. The fiscal end of year workload may have contributed to the low 
survey response rate within the organization.  
2. Responses by Employment Category 
The survey participants were asked if they were in the military or a civilian. Of 
those who completed the survey, the majority of the survey participants, 19, were 
civilians, and there were 13 military survey participants (Figure 8).  
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Figure 8.  Number of Participants by Employment Category 
3. Responses by Experience 
The survey participants were asked about their contracting experience. They were 
given five choices: 0 to 2 years of experience, 3 to 5 years of experience, 6 to 10 years of 
experience, 11 to 20 years of experience, and over 20 years of experience. There were 
survey participants from each experience level. There were four participants in the 0–2 
years of experience category, which represents the smallest percentage of the total 
participants (12 percent). There were nine participants in the 3-5 year category, which 
represents the largest percentage of the total participants (28 percent). There were 6 
participants in the 6-10 year category (19 percent), and 6 participants in the 10-20 year 
category (19 percent). Furthermore, there were 7 participants in the more than 20 years 







Figure 9.  Number of Participants by Experience Group 
4. Responses by DAWIA Certification Level 
The survey participants were asked to provide their DAWIA certification level. 
The choices were: N/A (implying no certification), Level I, Level II, and Level III. There 
were 15 participants that hold a level II certification which represented the majority of the 
total percentage of participants (47 percent). There were three participants that hold a 
level I certification, which represents the smallest percentage of total participants (nine 
percent). Additionally, there were 14 participants that hold a level III certification, which 
represents 44 percent of the total participants. Figure 10 shows the number of participants 
by DAWIA certification level. 
0 to 2 years, 4, 
12% 
3 to 5 years, 9, 
28% 
6 to 10 years, 6, 
19% 
11 to 20 years, 6, 
19% 
more than 20 
years, 7, 22% 
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Figure 10.  Number of Participants by DAWIA Certification Level 
5. Responses by Warrant Status 
The survey participants were also asked if they were warranted PCOs. There were 
23 participants (72 percent) that held a contracting warrant as contracting officers and 
nine (approximately 28 percent) who did not hold a contracting warrant. Figure 11 shows 
a visual depiction of these results. 
N/A, 0, 0% 
Level I, 3, 9% 
Level II, 15, 47% 




Figure 11.  Number of Participants by Warrant Status 
C. ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE QUESTIONS 
There were 27 knowledge questions that were categorized as contracting phase 
questions, internal control components questions, and procurement fraud scheme 
questions. Table 1 shows the breakdown of the questions by category. The average score, 
when calculated across all experience levels of the 32 participants, was 66.1 percent 
correct out of the 27 total knowledge questions. 
 






1. Analysis by Demographic Classification 
This research placed the survey participants into various categories, which 
allowed the researchers to further analyze differences in respondents throughout the 
knowledge questions. The categories included employment category, experience level, 
DAWIA certification level, and whether they held a Contracting Officer’s Warrant. 
a. Civilian or Military Status 
The survey participants were asked if they were in the military or a civilian. 32 
participants completed this section of the survey. The majority, 19, were civilians, and 
there were 13 military participants. Of the military participants who completed the 
survey, the average score was 69.2 percent. Of the civilian participants who completed 
the survey, the average score was 64.9 percent. Figure 12 displays the percentage of 
correct answers for all of the knowledge questions for survey participants in the military 
and civilian categories.  
 




































Figure 13 shows the average knowledge question scores by experience, or how 
many years the participant has been in the contracting career field. The scores ranged 
from 56.8 percent for participants with 11 to 20 years of experience to 76.7 percent for 
the participants with over 20 years of experience. The participants with the most 
experience in contracting received the highest scores on average.  
 
Figure 13.  Average Score by Experience Level 
c. DAWIA Certification Level 
The average scores of the knowledge questions grouped by DAWIA certification 
level have a positive correlation in that the knowledge question scores increased when the 
survey participants had a higher DAWIA certification level. The average scores ranged 
from 54.6 percent for Level I participants to 69.0 percent for Level III participants. 








































Figure 14.  Average Score by DAWIA Certification Level 
d. Warrant Status 
The survey participants with a Contracting Officer warrant received an average 
score of 64.4 percent on the knowledge questions. The survey participants with no 
warrant scored an average of 70.4 percent on the knowledge questions. Figure 15 shows 
the average scores for warranted and non-warranted survey participants on the knowledge 
questions.  
 






































































2. Analysis by Contracting Phases 
The average score of correct answers for all of the contracting phase knowledge 
questions was 64.4 percent. The highest average scores of the contracting phase 
knowledge questions was in procurement planning, which had an average score of 83.1 
percent. The lowest average scores of the contracting phase knowledge questions was in 
contract closeout, which had an average score of 48.4 percent. Figure 16 shows the 
average percentage of correct answers for the contracting phase questions. 
 
Figure 16.  Average Score by Contracting Phase 
3. Analysis by Internal Control Components 
The average score of correct answers for all of the internal control component 
knowledge questions was 63.0 percent. The highest average score of the internal control 
components knowledge questions was in control environment, which had an average 
score of 70.3 percent. The lowest average score of the internal control components 






































percent. Figure 17 shows the average score of internal control components knowledge 
questions by internal control components. 
 
Figure 17.  Average Score by Internal Control Component  
4. Analysis by Procurement Fraud Schemes 
The average score for the procurement fraud schemes knowledge questions was 
61.0 percent. The highest average score of the procurement fraud schemes knowledge 
questions was in collusion, which had an average score of 76 percent. The lowest average 
score of the procurement fraud schemes know questions was in fraudulent representation, 
which had an average score of  46.1 percent. Figure 18 displays the six procurement 












































Figure 18.  Average Score by Procurement Fraud Scheme Category 
5. Analysis of Specific Questions 
The knowledge questions were analyzed to identify the least and most missed 
knowledge questions. They were also reviewed by contracting phases, internal control 
components, and procurement fraud scheme and assessed according to category. 
a. Most and Least Missed Knowledge Questions 
The most frequently missed knowledge question out of all of the 27 questions on 
the survey was question 16. Only 34 percent of participants answered correctly, while 66 
percent answered incorrectly. 
16. Items that could potentially be for personal use or have resale value 
should most carefully be scrutinized when they 
A. Are typically frequently requested by end users 
B. Are included in contracts that are beyond the stated requirements 
C. Generally make up more than the usual percentage of total requests 
D. Are commonly only requested by one particular end user 





































The correct answer for question 16 is B. The purpose of this knowledge question 
was to test participants’ knowledge of detecting fraudulent activity by requirements 
generators. 
The knowledge question that survey participants missed the least was question 2. 
All 32 participants answered the question correctly; therefore, 100 percent of all 
participants answered this question correctly.  
2. Tailoring statements of work and specifications to suit a particular 
offeror 
A. Is an acceptable practice that shortens procurement lead times 
B. Helps level the playing field for disadvantaged competitors 
C. Is not acceptable because it prevents fair competition 
D. Is not acceptable because the government should not lower standards to 
industry levels 
E. I don’t know 
The correct answer for question 2 was C. The purpose of this knowledge question 
was to test participants’ knowledge of unacceptable behavior pertaining to tailoring 
statements of work.  
b. Contracting Phase Analysis 
The knowledge questions that were most missed from the contracting phase 
questions were the contract closeout questions. The average score on all of the contract 
closeout questions was 48.4 percent (Figure 16). The most missed question from the 
contract closeout portion was question 27. 
27. When closing out a contract, which one of the following items will 
MOST LIKELY be an indicator of over-charging during the performance of 
the contract? 
A. Discovery that the contractor didn’t disclose their discounts and credits 
B. Discovery of left over materials after the completion of performance 
C. Disclosure by the contractor of their greater than estimated profit in a 
fixed-priced contract 
D. The greater than expected amount of government furnished material that 
was returned 
E. I don’t know 
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The correct answer for question 27 is A. The most likely indicator of over-
charging would be if a contractor withheld information about potential discounts or 
credits. 
The contracting phase knowledge question that was least missed was the 
procurement planning phase. The average score in the procurement planning phase was 
the highest in the contracting phases at 83.1 percent (Figure 16). The least missed 
question was question 2. None of the participants missed this question. 
2. Tailoring statements of work and specification to suit a particular 
offeror 
A. Is an acceptable practice that shortens procurement lead times 
B. Helps level the playing field for disadvantaged competitors 
C. Is not acceptable because it prevents fair competition 
D. Is not acceptable because the government should not lower standards to 
industry levels 
E. I don’t know 
As previously mentioned, the correct answer for question 2 was C. The purpose of  
this knowledge question was to test participant’s knowledge of unacceptable behavior 
pertaining to tailoring statements of work. 
c. Internal Control Analysis 
The internal control component that was missed the most was Monitoring 
Activities. The average score for all of the survey participants on monitoring activities 
was 47.3 percent. The most missed question within the internal control component 
section was question 20.  
20. Which one of the following is permitted during discussions with 
offerors in the competitive range? 
A. Allowing the offeror to change their proposal 
B. Relaying technical details on a competitor’s proposal 
C. Not disclosing all the deficiencies in the contractor’s proposal 
D. All of the above 
E. I don’t know 
The correct answer for question 20 is A. According to Source Selection 
procedures, it is permitted to allow an offeror to change their proposal. The other answer 
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options for this question are not permitted during discussions with offerors in the 
competitive range. Some participants, 22 percent, answered C. This question was 
answered correctly by 47 percent of survey participants. 
The internal control component that was missed the least was in Control 
Environment. The participants’ average score of all of the Control Environment 
knowledge questions was 70.3 percent (Figure 17). The least missed question was 
question 9. 
9. When planning a solicitation, a good way to prevent possible co-
mingling of contracts is to 
A. Use previous solicitations as a template to aid in writing this one 
B. Rely on the end user in the writing of the requirements 
C. Review existing contracts to find potential overlap 
D. Rely on industry in the writing of the requirements 
E. I don’t know 
The correct answer for question 9 is C. A good way to prevent contract co-
mingling is to review the contracts for potential overlap. This question was answered 
correctly by 84 percent of survey participants. 
d. Procurement Fraud Scheme Analysis 
The procurement fraud scheme that had the most missed knowledge questions 
was the Fraudulent Representation questions. The average score on all of the Fraudulent 
Representation knowledge questions was 46.1 percent. The most missed fraudulent 
representation scheme question was 26.  
26. A thorough review of returned government furnished property from 
the contractor can help reveal the following fraudulent activities EXCEPT: 
A. Items being marked with incorrect disposal conditions codes 
B. The contractor failing to return government furnished property 
C. The contractor not needing the property to perform the contract 
D. The government furnished property being replaced by lesser value items 
E. I don’t know 
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The correct answer for question 26 is C. A review of government furnished 
property can reveal that the contractor did not need it to perform the contract. This 
question was missed by 44 percent of survey participants.  
The procurement fraud scheme that had the least missed knowledge questions was 
Collusion. The survey participants received an average score of 76.0 percent on all of the 
Collusion questions. The least missed collusion question was number 5. 
5. A reasonable way to minimize to potential of any possible collusion 
between an end user in your agency and an offeror is to 
A. Never use the recommended sources from the end user 
B. Continually rely on the same trusted industry sources 
C. Never use the highest bidder 
D. Have multiple sources for common requests  
E. I don’t know 
The correct answer for question 5 is D. This question was answered correctly by 
93 percent of participants. Multiple sources can help minimize possible collusion. 
D. ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL QUESTIONS 
In addition to the 27 knowledge questions on the survey, there were 12 
organizational questions. The first nine organizational questions asked the participants 
about their perception of procurement fraud in their organization. The last three of the 12 
organizational questions asked the survey participants about their perception of the 
organization and its susceptibility to fraud in the contracting phases, internal control 
components, and procurement fraud scheme categories. 
1. Analysis of Likert Scale Questions 
The survey contained nine Likert scale questions about the organization. The 
scaled answers were numerical and ranged from 0 to five: 5—strongly agree, 4—agree, 
3—neither agree nor disagree, 2—disagree, 1—strongly disagree, and 0—I don’t know. 
The responses to all nine of the questions averaged 3.91, and ranged from a low of 3.73 
to a high of 4.78. The high average score shows that the majority of the survey 
participants agreed that they believe their organization had good measures in place to 
combat procurement fraud.  
 60 
Out of the nine questions, question 3 received the highest average score. The 
question asked each of the participants if he or she would report fraudulent or suspicious 
activity if they saw or suspected it. As can be seen in Figure 19, question 3 averaged a 
score of 4.78. This score indicates that participants strongly agreed that they would report 
fraudulent or suspicious activity within their organization.  
 
Figure 19.  Highest Scored Likert Scale Question 
The Likert scale question that received the lowest scores was question 2. The 
question asked participants if their department was regularly reviewed by internal or 
external auditors. As can be seen in Figure 20, the average score for question 2 was 3.73. 
There were two participants that answered “I don’t know.” The average score of 3.73 
indicates that participants generally agreed that their department is regularly reviewed by 
internal or external auditors. 
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Figure 20.  Lowest Scored Likert Scale Question 
In addition to the highest and lowest scored Likert scale questions, question 6 was 
signigicant to note. The question asked participants if they believed that they had 
adequate knowledge of contracting fraud schemes to perform their duties. As can be seen 
in Figure 21, the average score for question 6 was 3.95. The average score of 3.95 
indicates that participants generally agreed that they had adequate knowledge to detect 
fraud schemes in the performance of their duties. 
 
Figure 21.  Self-Rating Likert Scale Question   
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2. Analysis of Perception Questions 
The researchers organized the questions into one of three categories and analyzed 
the percentage of fraud susceptibility within each category. These categories were 
contracting phase, internal control component, and procurement fraud scheme.  
a. Contracting Phase 
The survey asked participants which contracting phase they suspected was most 
vulnerable to fraudulent activity in their organization; responses are shown in Figure 21. 
The majority of the participants, 37 percent, said they did not suspect any fraudulent 
activities in their organization. Some participants, 22 percent, thought that contract 
administration was most vulnerable to fraudulent activity in their organization. None of 
the participants thought that their organization was susceptible to fraud in the 
procurement planning phase.  
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b. Internal Control Component 
The survey included a perception question that asked the survey participants 
which internal control component the participants suspected to be the most vulnerable for 
fraudulent activity within their organization. Half of the participants, 50 percent, said that 
they did not suspect any fraudulent activities in their organization. The second highest 
answer was information and communications. 16 percent of people suspected that the 
information and communications internal control component was most vulnerable to 
fraud activity (Figure 22).  
 
Figure 23.  Percentage of Responses to Internal Control Perception Question 
c. Procurement Fraud Scheme 
The survey participants were asked to which procurement fraud scheme they 
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approximately half of the participants, 47 percent, said that they did not suspect any 
fraudulent activities in their organization. There were some participants, however, who 
thought that their organization was susceptible to conflicts of interest, 22 percent, and 
collusion, 13 percent. 
 
Figure 24.  Percent of Responses to Procurement Fraud Scheme Question 
This marks the end of the findings and analysis portion of the research study. The 
next section of the research will discuss the recommendations based on the findings and 
analysis presented within this chapter. 
E. IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS 
The survey participants’ average scores on the knowledge questions held a 
negative correlation with their years of experience, with the exception of those 
participants who had over 20 years of experience. This negative correlation could appear 
for several reasons. It is possible that the participants may be getting complacent in their 
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get further away from when they completed their formal contracting training. The 
average knowledge test scores based on warrant also support the complacency theory. 
Those with a warrant received a lower score on their knowledge questions than those 
participants without a warrant. 
In addition to the negative correlation, the research also found that the majority of 
respondents did not suspect fraudulent activities within their organizations (Figures 21, 
22, and 23). Furthermore, for the organizational question number 6 “I have adequate 
knowledge of contracting schemes to perform my duties,” participants averaged 3.95 on 
the likert scale which is close to “Agree.” However, the average score on all of the 
knowledge questions amongst all participants on the knowledge assessment was a 66 
percent. This percentage is equivalent to a “D,” a failing letter grade by most academic 
standards. When the 66 percent average is compared to the responses noted in Figures 21, 
22, and  23, it begs the question of whether the participants have the sufficient knowledge 
level to suspect or identify fraud if it did occur within their organization or to perform 
their duties. These implications led the researchers to identify multiple recommendations 
for increasing procurement fraud knowledge within the contracting workforce, which are 
discussed next. 
F. RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON FINDINGS 
Based on the findings, there are four recommendations for change within DOD 
procurement. These findings mainly consist of increasing the training for the contracting 
workforce and emphasizing the need for more effective internal controls, capable 
processes, and competent personnel, that in turn can decrease the DOD’s vulnerability to 
fraudulent activities.  
1. Create and Mandate Procurement Fraud Training Programs 
The research findings suggest that a possible recourse for a lack of knowledge 
would be to conduct procurement fraud refresher training. According to DAU, 
contracting personnel are required to complete 80 Continuous Learning Points every two 
years in order to stay current with DAWIA standards. These points can be acquired either 
through formal classes or training provided by the unit. Procurement fraud training 
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(either conducted through local training or through the continuous learning module 
(CLM) on Procurement Fraud Indicators) could be incorporated within the contracting 
requirements in order to remain qualified. This additional training would help to ensure 
that the more experienced contracting personnel are provided refresher training and 
remain current. 
2. Emphasize Monitoring Activities 
The most frequently missed question out of all of the knowledge questions was in 
the monitoring activities internal control component category. The survey participants’ 
average score for monitoring activities questions was 47.3 percent. Monitoring activities 
received the lowest score out of all of the five internal control components. Organizations 
place a lot of emphasis on awarding contracts but not a lot of emphasis on the 
administration and monitoring of the contracts once they have been awarded. The lack of 
organizational emphasis on monitoring activities may have been the catalyst for low 
scores on this portion of the survey. Additionally, 9 percent of survey participants 
thought that monitoring activities were susceptible to fraudulent activity. The monitoring 
issue could be remedied if the organization implements the three attributes associated 
with monitoring the internal control components: establishment of a baseline, internal 
control system monitoring, and evaluation of results. According to GAO (2014), utilizing 
these three attributes “is essential in helping internal control remain aligned with 
changing objectives, environment, laws, resources, and risk” (p. 64). 
3. Emphasize Post Award Contract Management Phases 
The survey participants were asked which contracting phase was the most 
susceptible to fraudulent activity. The phase that received the most responses was 
contract administration. Additionally, survey participants received a 61.9 percent average 
score on the survey’s contract administration questions. The low average score could 
likely be attributed to a lack of emphasis on contract administration once the contract has 
been awarded. Also, many personnel may not know the proper way to administer 
contracts. In order to remedy this, additional training pertaining to contract monitoring 
could be provided regularly by the organization. The training will ensure that everyone, 
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experienced and inexperienced, performs the administration of contracts correctly 
throughout the organization. Fraud is more likely to occur in areas where contracting 
personnel are not trained or to where not enough attention is given.  
In addition to training in contract administration, contract closeout was another 
area in which survey participants received a low score (48 percent). In a recent study 
performed by GAO on closing aging contracts (2013), it was found that while military 
departments are making progress in better performing the closeout process, the 
departments must provide greater attention to contract closeout in order to develop 
meaningful and effective performance measures. Increased training locally, along with 
continued guidance at the DOD level, could result in increased knowledge in this phase 
of contract management.   
4. Emphasize Conflict of Interest Vulnerabilities 
A large number of the survey participants had over five years of contracting 
experience. The longer that contracting personnel have been in the career field, the more 
contracting people they meet and know both inside and outside of the government. While 
this type of networking can be beneficial to contract managers, it could also lead to 
personal relationships between the contractor and the personnel within the DOD. 
Conflicts of interest can happen very easily once contracting personnel have been in 
contracting for a significant amount of time. To address the high potential for conflicts of 
interest and the participants’ survey opinion of the higher risk area, conflict of interest 
could be addressed as a topic of concern within at least one course for each of the three 
DAWIA certification levels. In addition, all personnel within the acquisition team 
(including Program Managers, Commanders, and other installation stakeholders) should 
take an ethics currency training every two years that covers all procurement fraud 
schemes. 
G. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the findings from the survey were presented. The findings were 
broken down by the demographics of the organization surveyed. Then the survey 
responses were analyzed by procurement phase, internal control components, and 
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procurement fraud schemes. Each section analyzed the most and least missed questions. 
The chapter also discussed the organizational perception questions. Finally, four 
recommendations were provided to improve the contracting career field’s knowledge of 
fraud and potential contracting fraud susceptibilities. The final chapter will present the 
conclusion of this research and recommendations for future research opportunities on 




VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY 
While the potential for fraud exists in any environment in which the DOD enters 
into contractual agreements with non-government entities, it is important to remember 
that the contracting function is a very powerful tool when used correctly. With the proper 
training and oversight throughout the contracting process, contracting professionals can 
be the front-line defense for reducing the potential for procurement fraud. This study 
deployed a survey tool in order to gain insight into the knowledge level and perceptions 
of the contracting workforce in regards to procurement fraud knowledge. Within Chapter 
II, the research study discussed the six phases of the contract management process, along 
with the five internal control components, and the six most common procurement fraud 
schemes as expressed through the procurement fraud matrix. In addition to these 
overarching processes, the literature review covered DOD contracting as a whole as well 
as the agency’s response to fraud and the consequences associated with deficiencies in 
the DOD. Finally, the amount of fraud coverage addressed in the DAU courses was 
presented in order to determine whether acquisition students are presented with 
significant fraud training in a formal environment. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
By performing research through literature and deployment of a survey tool, the 
research team was able to answer the three research questions posed within this study. 
This research study answered the questions listed below through the literature review, the 
deployment of the assessment tool, and the analysis of the results. 
 What is the contracting workforces’ knowledge level of procurement 
fraud as related to the contract management process, the internal 
control components, and the procurement fraud scheme categories? 
There were varying levels of knowledge across the procurement fraud schemes 
amongst the survey participants. The survey revealed that out of the contracting phases, 
the participants had the best understanding of the procurement planning phase with the 
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highest average score (83 percent) out of all of the knowledge question sections. The 
participants scored the lowest, within the contracting phases, in contract closeout with a 
48.4 percent. The participants’ scores on the internal control components ranged from a 
high in the control environment with a 70.3 percent to a low in monitoring activities with 
participants only receiving an average score of 47.3 percent of the knowledge questions 
correct. The procurement fraud scheme category had the lowest knowledge test scores; 
participants on average scored a 46.1 percent in fraudulent representation. The highest 
scores within the procurement fraud scheme category were in collusion with an average 
score of 76 percent. The analysis shows that there are some strengths found within the 
contract management process, internal control components, and procurement fraud 
scheme categories. However, none of the categories received particularly high scores on 
any of the procurement fraud schemes categories. This indicates that the contracting 
organization may not be adequately prepared to identify procurement fraud schemes, 
which may leave the contracting organization vulnerable to procurement fraud. 
 What is the contracting workforce’s perception of procurement fraud 
vulnerability as related to the contract management process, the 
internal control components, and the procurement fraud scheme 
categories? 
The survey participants’ perceptions of procurement fraud vulnerability varied in 
relation to the contract management process, the internal control components and the 
procurement fraud scheme categories. Appropriately half of the participants did not 
suspect fraudulent activities in their organization. In the contracting phase, 37 percent of 
participants did not suspect fraudulent activities, but 22 percent of the participants 
indicated that contract administration was the contract management phase most 
vulnerable to fraud. In the internal control components, fifty percent of participants did 
not suspect fraudulent activity. However, information and communications was the next 
highest scoring category, with 16 percent of participants suspecting that it was the most 
vulnerable for fraudulent activity. Finally, the majority of participants (47 percent) did 
not suspect any fraudulent activity for procurement fraud schemes, but 22 percent of 
participants suspected that their organization was most susceptible to conflicts of interest. 
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Appropriately fifty percent of participants do not suspect fraud in their organization; 
however, there are areas for potential concern.  
 What is the procurement fraud coverage within the Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU) required/recommended courses for 
contracting professionals? 
There is very little coverage of procurement fraud with the DAU courses for 
contracting professionals. There is one six-hour course offered that is vectored towards 
auditing professionals that covers contracting fraud, and a two-hour module that is 
presented for all acquisition professionals, yet no courses exist within the core 
contracting curriculum. Additionally, while these courses may be available to all DAU 
students, there are no required courses for contracting professionals. A possible fix for 
this lack of coverage could be as simple as bringing this lack of coverage to the attention 
of DAU. The fact that DOD Contract Management has been on GAO’s High Risk List 
for over 20 years is indicative that fraud is an ongoing concern for the contracting 
workforce (GAO, 2013). With the agency at such a high risk due to lack of personnel and 
oversight, it is important to educate the limited personnel in such high threat areas. In 
addition to the three questions, the research provided additional points of interest in 
which further research could be conducted in the future.  
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Based on our research findings and recommendations, we identify multiple areas 
for further research. The survey should be deployed to several other contracting 
organizations within the Air Force. More information and a larger pool of participants 
would help to confirm the survey results of this research study. Additionally, the survey 
should be deployed well before August and September in order to avoid the hustle and 
bustle of the end of fiscal year. The end of year workload is the heaviest during the fiscal 
end of year and many times the potential participants do not have the time necessary to 
answer survey questions. The response rate would likely be higher if the survey is 
deployed during the months of November through April, as these tend to be the least busy 
for contracting professionals.  
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Another area for more research would be the addition of procurement fraud 
education questions within the survey. A portion of questions could be added to the 
survey that asks the participants about their experience with formal procurement fraud 
training. The questions should ask them how much procurement fraud training they have 
received and at what point in their career they received it. The questions could potentially 
provide more detail, such as: how many times a year do they receive fraud training, or 
how many procurement fraud courses did they need to take within each DAWIA 
certification level. The survey should add any questions that can pinpoint the existing 
procurement fraud training within the contracting workforce.  
Finally, as this research is a continuation of research performed by Chang’s study 
on Army contracting, the possibility of assessing Navy processes and controls could also 
be a point for future research. As stated by GAO (2013), fraud is a universal problem that 
must be addressed throughout the DOD. By deploying the survey to all of the service 
components, there is a greater possibility of uncovering trends that may be occurring 
throughout the services or pinpointing problem areas that may only be affecting one 
service component. Continuing research can also utilize this study, along with Chang’s, 
to possibly compare and contrast the fraud knowledge level of contracting personnel 
within each distinctive service.  
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APPENDIX. LIKERT SCALE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
1. My department has clear lines of authority and responsibility. 
 
                 4.03        
      
1      2       3     4    5 
                                                                  
        
Strongly  Disagree  Neither   Agree                  Strongly  
Disagree      Agree nor           Agree 
       Disagree 
 
I prefer not to answer: 0. 
 
 
2. My department is regularly reviewed by internal or external auditors. 
 
                        3.73         
          
1  2   3      4      5 
                                                                  
        
Strongly         Disagree      Neither     Agree            Strongly  
Disagree       Agree nor                 Agree 
         Disagree 
 
I don’t know: 2 
 
 
3. I would report fraudulent or suspicious activity if I saw or suspected it. 
 
                     4.78    
          
1 2    3   4    5 
                                                                  
        
Strongly  Disagree  Neither   Agree                  Strongly  
Disagree      Agree nor           Agree 
       Disagree 
 






4. I have a clear way of reporting fraudulent or suspicious activity within my 
organization outside of my immediate supervisor. 
 
                     4.5        
          
1 2   3     4        5 
                                                                  
        
Strongly         Disagree      Neither       Agree      Strongly  
Disagree       Agree nor            Agree 
        Disagree 
 
I don’t know: 0 
 
5. I know who to report to if I saw or suspected fraudulent activities. 
 
                 4.39       
          
1       2      3             4           5 
                                                                  
        
Strongly       Disagree          Neither      Agree         Strongly  
Disagree    Agree nor                      Agree 
     Disagree 
 
I don’t know: 1 
 
 
6. I have adequate knowledge of contracting fraud schemes to perform my duties. 
 
                      3.95          
          
1  2   3        4    5 
                                                                 
         
Strongly  Disagree  Neither           Agree       Strongly  
Disagree      Agree nor           Agree 
       Disagree 
 









7. Instances of reported suspected fraudulent or suspicious activity have been 
adequately investigated by my organization. 
 
                   3.95       
          
1  2  3     4   5 
                                                                  
        
Strongly         Disagree       Neither        Agree      Strongly  
Disagree       Agree nor                      Agree 
        Disagree 
 
I don’t know: 12 
 
 
8. Employees in my organization who are found to have participated in fraudulent 
activities will be subject to appropriate consequences. 
 
                4.31        
          
1 2   3          4      5 
                                                                 
         
Strongly         Disagree       Neither         Agree      Strongly  
Disagree         Agree nor            Agree 
          Disagree 
 
I don’t know: 6 
 
9. My organization places sufficient emphasis on the importance of integrity, ethical 
conduct, fairness and honesty in their dealings with employees, vendors, and other 
organizations. 
 
               4.25      
          
1  2   3             4  5 
                                                                 
         
Strongly Disagree Neither      Agree      Strongly  
Disagree    Agree nor                    Agree 
     Disagree 
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